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generally 
classified 
as generic, 
preferred 
b r a n d -
name, or 
n o n -
preferred 
brand-name, with increased cost sharing 
for each tier.8  Cost-sharing mechanisms 
such as coinsurance or copayments are 
intended to reduce overconsumption 
created by moral hazard.9  
Theoretically, patients responsible 
for the full cost of a prescribed service or 
medication will choose to purchase only 
those for which the benefit exceeds the 
total cost.10  In practice, however, patients 
(„VBID,‟ Continued on page 11) 
health plans, and pharmacy benefit man-
agers and is specifically permitted by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act.5  VBID does not alter the existing 
insurance structure; rather, it introduces 
evidence-based medicine to cost-sharing 
formulas to create consumer incentives 
that improve health for sufferers of 
chronic conditions while reducing costs 
to both patients and insurers.6  To under-
stand how VBID will achieve these dual 
goals, it is important to understand how 
the current cost-sharing system frustrates 
the need to improve health and contain 
costs. 
How Insurance Cost Sharing Works 
Ninety percent of all private insur-
ance plans use a tiered cost-sharing pre-
scription drug benefit plan.7  Drugs are 
small number of children whose health or 
religious beliefs make mandatory vaccina-
tion an unreasonable burden.13   
The Conscientious Exemption  
The rallying parents came out in sup-
port of a New Jersey bill that would pro-
vide for a “conscientious exemption,” 
defined as “an exemption from manda-
tory vaccination on the grounds of a sin-
cerely held or moral objection to vaccina-
tion.”14  In order to qualify for the pro-
posed “conscientious exemption,” a par-
ent must obtain certain forms from a 
public health official, prove that she has 
been educated about the dangers of not 
vaccinating, and submit her objections to 
particular vaccines in writing to a public 
health department.15 
The New Jersey Department of 
Health and Senior Services (DHSS) has 
firmly opposed the conscientious exemp-
tions bill.16  DHSS has stated that        
(„New Jersey‟s Vaccination Policy,‟ Continued on page 10) 
The language of New Jersey school 
vaccination laws does not give parents 
much choice concerning vaccination.  
New Jersey permits only medical and 
religious exemptions from vaccination.7  
In order to receive a medical exemption, a 
physician or registered nurse must write a 
statement that the child has a medical 
contraindication listed in the guidelines of 
the Centers for Disease Control‟s Advi-
sory Committee of Immunization Prac-
tices or the American Academy of Pediat-
rics.8  In order to get a religious exemp-
tion, a parent must write a statement that 
the child has “bona fide” religious beliefs 
that conflict with vaccination.9   
New Jersey‟s vaccination policies are 
a balance of public health and personal 
liberty.10  Mandatory school vaccinations 
have been instrumental in eliminating 
infectious diseases.11 Because infectious 
diseases can be eliminated even with vac-
cination rates below one-hundred per-
cent,12 the state legislature has determined 
that it is reasonable to accommodate the 
One Non-legislative Health  
Reform Option  
  Kate Freed 
  katherine.freed@student.shu.edu 
 
The Political Problem for Health Re-
form 
President Obama signed into law the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 20101 on March 23 and the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act2 
on March 30.3  The passage of these two 
contentious bills ushers in the most far-
reaching legislative health reforms since 
1965.  In response, fourteen states are 
challenging the validity of these laws in 
federal court.4  However, one reform that 
both parties will likely agree upon is value
-based insurance design (VBID).  VBID 
has been implemented by employers, 
The Conscientious Exemption 
Bill 
  Michael Poreda 
   poreda@hotmail.com 
The Flu Vaccine Protest 
When New Jersey became the first 
state to require a flu vaccine for children 
in 2008, parents protested outside the 
State House.1  The new mandate requires 
children ages six months to five years to 
get an annual flu shot in order to attend a 
child-care facility.2  Some protesting par-
ents expressed fear that adding the flu 
vaccine to an ever-growing number of 
required vaccines might be unhealthy.3  
Many expressed particular fears that vac-
cines cause autism.4  Louise Habakus, a 
spokesperson for New Jersey Coalition 
for Vaccination Choice, one of the rally 
organizers, stated that it was an issue of 
parental autonomy.5  “This is not an anti-
vaccine rally—it‟s a freedom of choice 
rally.”6  
Current Law 
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Reforming New Jersey’s Vaccination Exemption Policy 
Value-based Insurance Design  
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The Highs (and Lows) of  
Legalizing Medical Marijuana 
 
Nicole Hamberger  
      nicole.hamberger@student.shu.edu 
 
On January 18, 2010, New Jersey 
became the fourteenth state in the nation 
to permit the use of marijuana for medical 
purposes.1  The New Jersey Compassion-
ate Use Medical Marijuana Act (Act) was 
enacted after the state legislature con-
cluded that “modern medical research has 
discovered a beneficial use for marijuana 
in treating or alleviating the pain or other 
symptoms associated with certain debili-
tating conditions.”2  In effect, the Act‟s 
purpose is “to protect” medical marijuana 
patients, their primary caregivers, and 
their physicians from “arrest . . . and 
criminal and other penalties.”3  While the 
Act is a significant first step in making 
medical marijuana accessible to patients, it 
is relatively narrow in scope and may 
erect significant access barriers against 
certain patients who could benefit from 
medical marijuana.4 
Limited Medical Conditions 
Five groups of patient conditions 
qualify for treatment under the Act.  The 
first group that qualifies for access to 
medical marijuana consists of those con-
ditions considered to be “[d]ebilitating 
medical condition[s]” that are “resistant 
to conventional medical therapy.”5 Such 
conditions are listed as “seizure disorders 
[including epilepsy], intractable skeletal 
muscular spasticity, or glaucoma.”6    
Under the second group, the patient 
must have one of the following types of 
conditions: a “positive status for human 
immunodeficiency virus [HIV], acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome [AIDS], or 
cancer.”7  This group must also exhibit 
one of the following symptoms: “severe 
or chronic pain, nausea or vomiting, 
cachexia [a wasting syndrome]8 or [any 
other] wasting syndrome result[ing] from 
the condition or treatment thereof.”9 
The third group of conditions in-
cludes “amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, mul-
tiple sclerosis, terminal cancer, muscular 
dystrophy, or inflammatory bowel disease 
including Crohn‟s disease.”10  A patient 
who does not have any of these illnesses 
may still fall within the fourth or fifth 
groups which cover “terminal illness, if 
the physician has determined a prognosis 
of less than [twelve] months of life”11 or 
“any other medical condition or its treat-
ment that is approved by the department 
by regulation.”12 
While the Act certainly supplies relief 
to a large group of sufferers, others are 
left behind.  Individuals such as those 
suffering from cystic fibrosis are not ex-
plicitly included in the Act.13  News re-
ports in the wake of the legislation men-
tion stories such as that of cystic fibrosis 
sufferer Brian Sercus, who suffers from 
loss of appetite and is required to con-
sume 5,000 calories a day because his 
“body consumes a lot of calories just to 
maintain itself.”14  He believes that he is 
one of many who would benefit from the 
appetite-inducing effects of THC (a sub-
stance in marijuana).15  Others who suffer 
from conditions such as anxiety and gen-
eralized chronic pain, conditions that 
qualify under the California Compassion-
ate Use Act, are similarly outside of the 
Act‟s scope.16   
Hope does exist, however, for those 
who wish for expansion of the Act‟s 
scope of permissible conditions.  The Act 
gives the Commissioner authority to add 
new debilitating medical conditions to 
those included in the Act.17  These regula-
tions are to be implemented by October 
2010.18  
No Insurance Coverage Mandate 
The Act explains that “[n]othing in 
this act shall be construed to require a 
government medical assistance program 
or private health insurer to reimburse a 
person for costs associated with medical 
use of marijuana . . . .”19  Medical mari-
juana will therefore fall outside of the 
budgets of many Medicaid and Medicare 
patients as both services require compli-
ance with federal laws as a precondition 
for government assistance; any marijuana 
costs by patients eligible under the Act 
will have to be financed from personal 
out-of-pocket costs.20  Lack of sufficient 
resources may also plague those with pri-
vate insurance who otherwise rely on 
prescription drug plans to help assist with 
prescription drug costs.21   
The price of medical marijuana is not 
provided in the Act, which states only 
that the Alternative Treatment Centers 
(“Centers”) which dispense the marijuana 
may charge “reasonable” prices.22  In an 
attempt to control costs, the Act man-
dates that the first six Centers be non-
profit and that they be evenly dispersed 
so that there are two nonprofit Centers 
each in northern, central, and southern 
New Jersey.23  After these nonprofit Cen-
ters are established, however, individuals 
on the open market may apply to the 
Department of Health and Senior Ser-
vices to open their own for-profit Cen-
ters, conditioned upon passing a criminal 
background check.24  
E v e n 
with pre-
s u m a b l y 
c h e a p e r 
s t a t e -
r e g u l a t e d 
C e n t e r s , 
the cost of 
(„New Jersey‟s Rigorous Requisites,‟ Continued on page 13) 
“WHILE THE ACT CERTAINLY 
SUPPLIES RELIEF TO A LARGE 
GROUP OF SUFFERERS, 
OTHERS ARE LEFT BEHIND.”  
The Rigorous Requisites to Compassionate Use in New Jersey  
The New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act  
compounds present in marijuana may be 
therapeutically beneficial as well.5  
Possible Benefits vs. Negative  Conse-
quences  
Alternative and holistic approaches 
to medicine suggest that treatment is 
more than science and that therapeutic 
value should take into account the entire 
experience accompanying a particular 
treatment.6  While evidence suggests that 
smoking marijuana is more therapeutic 
than taking a pill form of THC, much of 
this evidence is anecdotal due to a lack of 
research on the subject.7  Heavy regula-
tion by the federal government severely 
restricts necessary investigation into this 
area.  For example, at present the Univer-
sity of Mississippi has the only federally 
approved marijuana plantation in the 
country.8  Furthermore, researchers wish-
ing to investigate medical marijuana use 
must apply to multiple government agen-
cies including the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse (NIDA), Public Health Ser-
vice panel (PHS), Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), and Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).9  
As spokesperson for NIDA ex-
plained: “As the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, our focus is primarily on the 
negative consequences of marijuana use.  
We generally do not fund research fo-
cused on the potential beneficial medical 
effects of marijuana.”10  While this may 
be due to a fear that the possible negative 
consequences of marijuana on health and 
society will expand with the legalization 
of marijuana for medicinal purposes, it 
seems unlikely that  the desire to keep 
marijuana‟s use as limited as possible by 
making it illegal in all circumstances is 
justified. 
Like most drugs, marijuana has side 
effects and negative consequences.  As 
discussed in a National Institute of Health 
(NIH) workshop on the medical utility of 
marijuana, the risks associated with mari-
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The Debate over Legalization of 
Medical Marijuana  
 
        Stephanie Mazzaro  
stephanie.mazzaro@student.shu.edu  
 
Former New Jersey Governor Corz-
ine, on his last day in office, signed the 
Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana 
Act (“Compassionate Use Act”), making 
New Jersey the fourteenth state to legalize 
the use of medical marijuana.1  Patients in 
New Jersey now find hope to ease their 
suffering from nausea, wasting, seizures, 
spasms, and pain, where traditional meth-
ods prove ineffective or inefficient.2  
While this issue continues to spark heated 
debate with strong arguments made by 
both sides, suffering patients in the re-
maining thirty-six states continue to won-
der whether they too might find relief in 
the near future.  Opinions vary greatly on 
the topic, leaving many to question what 
all of the fuss is about. 
Patients suffering 
from diseases such as 
cancer, amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (“Lou 
Gehrig‟s Disease”), 
and AIDS find multi-
ple benefits from 
using marijuana.  For 
instance, it has been 
said to increase appe-
tite in cachexic—or 
emaciated—AIDS patients, alleviate nau-
sea and vomiting in cancer patients on 
chemotherapy, and suppress muscle 
spasms in patients with Crohn‟s Disease 
and multiple sclerosis.3  The marijuana 
plant itself contains over four hundred 
chemicals, but researchers have isolated 
its most active ingredient, delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which they 
have processed into pill form.4  While 
physicians may legally prescribe this oral 
medication, it provides only one compo-
nent of the marijuana plant, and other 
juana, especially when smoked, must be 
considered in terms of immediate effects 
on the lungs as well as long-term effects 
on patients with chronic illness.11  Clini-
cally significant impairment of immune 
system function, a potential side effect 
under study, may be especially detrimental 
to someone with an already serious ill-
ness.12 
Because there is evidence that smok-
ing marijuana has positive benefits for 
patients, however, more research should 
be done to determine whether the experi-
ence of smoking is, in fact, a contributor 
to marijuana‟s therapeutic effect.  While 
smoking carries with it its own negative 
consequences, the possible benefits 
should not be written off by such poten-
tial problems where the benefits have not 
even been properly researched and quan-
tified.  A fair comparison cannot be made 
as long as so little research exists on pos-
sible benefits of smoking marijuana. 
Drugs Compared 
The definition of “drug” under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
(FDCA) includes an article used in the 
treatment of disease or one intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the 
body.13  Over-the-counter drugs, such as 
common cold medications, post potential 
side effects on their warning label.14  
These side effects grow in number and 
seriousness with prescription medications 
that require approval by a physician, nurse 
practitioner, or physician‟s assistant.15 
Comparison between marijuana and 
prescription drugs used under careful 
supervision tends to show that the side 
effects are relatively similar in terms of 
(„So Close  Yet So Far,‟ Continued on page 13) 
“A FAIR COMPARISON CANNOT BE 
MADE AS LONG AS SO LITTLE RE-
SEARCH EXISTS ON POSSIBLE BENEFITS 
OF SMOKING MARIJUANA.” 
So Close and Yet So Far  
The New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act  
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A New New Thing with Some 
Old Problems 
        Thomas L. Greaney* 
         greanetl@slu.edu 
 
When pressed for evidence that the 
proposed health reform legislation will 
control costs, proponents invariably cite 
the numerous pilot programs and other 
innovations in Medicare payment policy 
contained in the bill.  Among the most 
promising of these is the “Shared Savings 
Program” found in Section 3022 of H.R. 
3590,1 which will test the effectiveness of 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) 
in rationalizing the delivery system and 
controlling costs.  The idea, which carries 
the endorsement of  the Medicare Pay-
ment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)2 
and the influential health service research-
ers at Dartmouth,3 is not entirely novel.  
In many respects the ACO is the latest in 
a long line of efforts to develop integrated 
delivery systems that bear financial re-
sponsibility for treatment decisions.  In 
addition, a number of experiments in-
volving bundled payments to ACOs and 
to other innovative organizations (as in 
Medicare‟s Physician Group Practice 
demonstration) have been underway for 
some time.  
Supporters contend that as a volun-
tary pilot program, ACOs can develop in 
forms suitable to local market conditions 
and gain acceptance in the physician com-
munities that have proved resistant to 
managed care structures in the past.  In 
the long run, the aspiration is that private 
insurers will follow suit and proliferating 
ACOs will lead the way to delivery system 
reform. 
The ACO concept envisions a legal 
entity comprised of and controlled by 
providers that would assume financial 
responsibility for the cost and care of a 
defined population of Medicare benefici-
aries while being subject to a variety of 
quality standards and information report-
ing requirements.4  The new law leaves 
much detail to the discretion of the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS),5 presumably 
informed by experience and learning as 
the program progresses.  For example, 
the legislation delegates development of 
standards for quality, use of evidence-
based medicine, and “patient-
centeredness” to HHS.6  In addition, 
ACOs may take diverse forms, such as 
local networks of physicians, hospitals, 
and their affiliated physicians, fully inte-
grated health systems, or “virtual” net-
works of providers.7  Notably, as pro-
posed in the House Reform bill, the pro-
gram would have tested alternative incen-
t i v e  p a y m e n t  m e t h o d o l o g i e s 
(performance targets and capitation pay-
ment).  The law ultimately adopted relies 
initially on shared savings; that is, the 
ACO will receive and distribute a rebate 
representing a portion of the savings it 
has achieved through more efficient prac-
tices.8   
A critical problem, largely ignored 
during the legislative debate, is the likely 
tension between the legislation‟s overall 
reliance on competition and the organiza-
tional structures and norms that may be 
established by ACOs.  At first blush, the 
ACO model seems well designed to foster 
competition among providers.  Not 
unlike health maintenance organizations 
and other integrated delivery forms, 
ACOs assume responsibility for coordi-
nating care and thus have strong incen-
tives to provide cost-effective care and to 
do so in a manner that is transparent and 
hospitable to comparative shoppers. 
But at the same time, the path of 
ACO development could prove pro-
foundly anti-competitive.  The concern 
lies with the possible exacerbation of al-
ready-weak competitive conditions pre-
vailing in provider markets.  Owing to 
indifferent enforcement of antitrust laws 
by the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice over the last ten 
years and questionable judicial precedents, 
hospital mergers proceeded at an un-
precedented pace.9  Over ninety-three 
percent of the nation‟s population lived in 
concentrated hospital markets, and the 
American consumer bore the brunt of the 
predictable outcome: hospital consolida-
tion in the 1990s raised overall inpatient 
prices by at least five percent and by forty 
percent or more when merging hospitals 
were closely located.10  Less well noted is 
the concentration in specialty physician 
markets that went unchallenged during 
recent years, lessening the ability of man-
aged care organizations to negotiate lower 
prices for their services.11  Further, even 
where antitrust prosecutors were active, 
challenging over seventy-five physician 
cartels involved in price fixing or efforts 
to thwart managed care, the relief gained 
was little more than a wrist slap, an unfor-
tunate dereliction that certainly did little 
to foster competitive norms in the pro-
vider community.12  Overall, it is fair to 
characterize the prevailing attitude among 
providers over the past thirty years as one 
of seeking first to avoid competition 
though concentrative mergers and other 
affiliations and, in some cases, by engag-
ing in illegal collusion. 
Encouraging competitive develop-
ment of ACOs in this market environ-
ment may prove challenging.  First, it is 
(„ACOs,‟ Continued on page 7) 
“THE NEW LAW LEAVES MUCH DE-
TAIL TO THE DISCRETION OF THE 
SECRETARY  OF  [HHS],              
PRESUMABLY INFORMED BY      
EXPERIENCE AND LEARNING AS THE 
PROGRAM PROGRESSES. ” 
*Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Director, 
Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University 
School of Law  
Accountable Care Organizations  
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cles to effectively implementing that goal.  
First, as discussed above, the highly con-
centrated state of many provider markets 
may make it difficult for HHS to secure 
participants willing to “share” their sav-
ings proportionately with other providers.  
Moreover, if the Medicare ACOs are seen 
as likely to be adopted by private insurers, 
dominant providers will not be reticent to 
exercise their market clout.  As Robert 
Leibenluft, a former FTC official has 
pointed out, in allocating among them-
selves the shared savings of their ACO, 
physicians and hospitals may adversely 
affect competition in the private market:  
The meetings at which the 
reallocation of those funds oc-
curs may . . . be the types of 
meetings in which price collu-
sion can take place.  Deciding 
how ACO revenues should be 
divided among the ACO par-
ticipants typically would not 
raise antitrust concerns, but 
serious issues would arise if 
such discussions spill over into 
how independent providers will 
contract outside the ACO con-
text.  
The new arrangements also 
may make it easier for physi-
cians to exclude potential com-
petitors from entry into the 
local market.14 
As I have argued elsewhere,15 the 
structure of our health care delivery sys-
tem gives us the worst of both worlds: 
fragmentation and concentration.  Hospi-
tal and specialty provider markets are 
highly concentrated; most primary care 
physicians remain in “silos” of solo or 
small practice groups; and there is scant 
“vertical integration” among providers of 
different services.  Not only does this 
phenomenon impede effective bargaining 
to reduce costs and prevent overutiliza-
tion of services, but it also has adverse 
effects on the quality of health services 
patients receive because it inhibits coordi-
nation of care.  While ACOs represent 
the most promising antidote on the hori-
zon to this problem, their success will 
depend on vigilant monitoring of com-
petitive conditions by HHS and the anti-
trust enforcement authorities. ☼ 
 
unclear the extent to which regulators will 
foster the formation of multiple, competi-
tive ACOs around the country.  It is cer-
tainly feasible that HHS might determine 
(as the reform legislation appears to al-
low) that it is more important to encour-
age voluntary participation in ACOs than 
to promote competitive ACOs.  An 
“open door” policy for ACOs (allowing 
them to include all comers in their mar-
kets) would likely lead to concentrated 
formal and informal affiliations.  (As 
noted above, the FTC has dealt with doz-
ens of proposed physician networks and 
“super PHOs” of considerable size that 
proposed to bargain on behalf of physi-
cians and hospitals; efforts to create over-
inclusive ACOs to lessen rivalry are 
unlikely to diminish.)  It also bears re-
membering that provider groups have 
lobbied incessantly for many years for 
exemptions from antitrust laws, arguing at 
various times that a “level playing field” 
justified collective bargaining by physi-
cians, or that efficiency would be im-
proved by such immunity.13 
Even if the Secretary adopts a policy 
of encouraging competition among 
ACOs, there may be competitive obsta-
 A Tobacco Product or a Drug-
Device Combination?  
       Matthew McKennan                          
       matthew.mckennan@student.shu.edu 
  
On January 14, 2010, the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Columbia granted a preliminary injunc-
tion against the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA), stopping the agency from 
seizing shipments of electronic cigarettes.1  
On February 1, 2010, the FDA appealed 
the District Court‟s decision, seeking to 
defend its jurisdiction over e-cigarette 
regulation.2  The District Court‟s decision 
and the subsequent appeal have sparked 
controversy among smokers, e-cigarette 
users, and public health advocates regard-
ing the FDA‟s ability to regulate tobacco 
products and the safety of e-cigarettes.  
What Is an Electronic Cigarette? 
An electronic cigarette (“e-cigarette”) 
is a device with three basic parts: a car-
tridge containing chemical ingredients, a 
heating element, and electronics with a 
battery.3  The device is made to resemble, 
in form and in function, an actual ciga-
rette.4  The cartridge, or mouthpiece, typi-
cally holds propylene glycol and liquid 
nicotine.5  The heating element, powered 
by the electronics and the battery, heats 
the liquid nicotine and vaporizes the mix-
ture.6  The electronics detect when a 
smoker inhales, then trigger the heating 
element which in turn releases the vapor-
ized mixture, mimicking real cigarettes.7  
According to Smoking Everywhere, Inc., 
the e-cigarette distributor and importer 
challenging the FDA‟s ability to seize or 
(„Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 16) 
 ‘ACOs,’ Continued 
Electronic Cigarettes 
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An Analysis of the Health Impli-
cations of Child Marriage in 
West Africa 
       Dawn Amber Pepin                          
       dawn.pepin@student.shu.edu 
 
Takia: age 12, married 
at 9 in Niger: . . . “One 
day my father told me that I 
was to be married.  I was 
never asked if I loved him or 
not.  But it was my duty to 
respect the decision of my 
parents.”  Representatives from the local youth 
organization say Takia‟s husband is 45 or 50.  
He promised—and waited—until Takia was 
11 before consummating the marriage.  She 
became pregnant soon after, and gave birth at 11, 
at home, to a daughter, Layla.1 
☼ ☼ ☼ 
Child marriage remains a common 
practice among many groups in countries 
around the world, with West Africa ex-
periencing notoriously high rates.2  At a 
young age, girls are socially isolated, de-
nied education, subjected to grave health 
risks, and often the victims of domestic 
violence.3  This practice arguably violates 
many provisions of human rights treaties, 
including provisions demanding health, 
equality, access to education, and in some 
cases those guaranteeing freedom from 
torture and slavery.4  Analyzing the health 
implications of child marriage using inter-
national human rights treaties, with a fo-
cus on West Africa, demonstrates that 
states have an obligation to protect these 
vulnerable children.   
Background on Child Marriage 
Child marriage is still prevalent in 
many developing countries; in fact, there 
are millions of child brides every year.5  
The 2003 Demographic and Health Sur-
vey program reported that fifty-one mil-
lion girls ages fifteen to nineteen were 
married worldwide.6  The United Nations 
Population Fund believes that over one-
hundred million girls will be married in 
the next decade.7  These child marriages 
are often coupled with extremely negative 
health implications.   
When a girl is married as a child she 
is often forced to have unprotected sex 
with an older man who has had multiple 
sexual partners.8  Marriage to an older 
man therefore puts the girl at greater risk 
for sexually transmitted diseases.9  Young 
girls with older husbands often feel pres-
sured to demonstrate fertility and are 
unable or too embarrassed to talk to their 
husbands about protected sex.10  Unfortu-
nately, the rates of contraceptive use in 
West Africa are still less than ten percent.  
For this reason, a young girl who is mar-
ried is more likely to contract a sexually 
transmitted disease than her unmarried 
counterpart.12  Additionally, married girls 
are two to eight times more likely to con-
tract HIV than boys of the same age.13  
One Malian study looked at cervical can-
cer, which is closely linked with the hu-
man papillomavirus (HPV), to indentify 
the major risk factors in developing the 
disease.14  The study found that the major 
risk factors for cervical cancer in the re-
gion were child marriage, a high number 
of births, and polygamous husbands.15   
Girls are not only at a greater risk for 
sexually transmitted diseases but also for 
pregnancy at a young age; early pregnan-
cies can result in catastrophic impacts on 
the girl‟s health.16 Rates of early child 
bearing are very high in West Africa.17  
Mali serves as a striking example.  One in 
ten girls in Mali gives birth before the age 
of fifteen.18  By ages fifteen to nineteen 
sixty-three percent of girls have already 
given birth.19  Early child bearing results 
in significantly higher maternal mortality 
and morbidity.20   In Mali, the maternal 
mortality and morbidity rates (MMR) for 
girls ages fifteen to nineteen are 178 
deaths per 1000 live births.21  This rate is 
significantly reduced to 32 deaths per 
1000 live births for those who give birth 
between the ages of twenty and thirty-
four years.22   
Complications during delivery are 
generally said to be a result of pregnancies 
being “too soon, too close, too many, or 
too late.”23  In fact, compared to women 
who give birth after twenty years of age, 
those who are fifteen to nineteen years 
old are twice as likely to die, and those 
who are ten to fourteen years old are five 
to seven times more likely to die from 
childbirth.24  These early deaths are typi-
cally the result of post-partum hemor-
rhaging, eclampsia, HIV infection, or 
obstructed birth.25  When a girl with an 
underdeveloped pelvis gives birth it often 
leads to obstructed labor.26  In many 
cases, the young mother will need a cesar-
ean section because without one the un-
born child will die and the mother will be 
lucky to live.27  Even if the mother lives, 
she is likely to develop an obstetric fistula, 
an embarrassing condition that results in 
uncontrollable passing of fecal matter and 
urine.28  As a result, the condition often 
leads to ostracism and depression.29  
Child marriage often contributes to 
mental health problems as well.  Depres-
sion and lack of identity are common 
among girls married at a young age.30  A 
woman who marries as a child misses the 
(„Child Marriage,‟ Continued on page 12) 
“THESE CHILD MARRIAGES 
ARE OFTEN COUPLED WITH 
EXTREMELY NEGATIVE HEALTH 
IMPLICATIONS. ” 
“He Who Has Health Has Hope, and He Who Has Hope Has 
Everything” 
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An Evaluation of FDA  
Regulatory Letter Policy 
         Rachel Jones  
          rachel.jones@student.shu.edu 
 
Recently, the FDA has noticeably 
increased the number of regulatory letters 
sent to alleged violators of its rules and 
regulations.  Most notably, the Division 
of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and 
Communications (DDMAC) issued thir-
teen regulatory letters in the first quarter 
of 2010, compared to a total of forty-one 
in 2009 and twenty-one in 2008.1  In addi-
tion, the FDA has shown increased scope 
of monitoring by issuing a regulatory let-
ter to a well-renowned dermatologist who 
specializes in cosmetic medicine.2  
Dubbed the Skin Guru, Dr. Leslie 
Baumann may be the first clinical investi-
gator3 to receive an untitled letter from 
the FDA based solely on alleged viola-
tions for promo-
tion of an unap-
proved drug under 
2 1  C . F . R .              
§ 312.7(a).4   
Background 
The FDA is 
cha r ged  w i th 
monitoring, inves-
tigating, and legally 
pursuing violations of the federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) and 
other FDA regulations.5  The FDA‟s pol-
icy is to issue regulatory letters as a 
mechanism to enforce voluntary compli-
ance with the law.6  The FDA is not re-
quired, however, to notify an individual 
or company of a violation before seeking 
enforcement action.7 
There are two types of regulatory 
letters that the FDA may issue.  A 
“warning letter” may be issued if a viola-
tion has met the threshold of “regulatory 
significance,” and an “untitled letter” may 
be issued when the threshold has not 
been met.8  Under the first type, a viola-
tion that appears to have “regulatory sig-
nificance” must also be significant 
enough that it may lead the FDA to pur-
sue an enforcement action if not 
promptly and adequately corrected.9  The 
“untitled letter” is less severe and is gen-
erally issued when a violation has oc-
curred but is not significant enough to 
warrant immediate enforcement action by 
the FDA.  
Rapid Increase in Issued Regulatory 
Letters 
(„FDA Warnings on the Rise‟, Continued on page 15) 
Who Gets to Decide? 
         Constantina Koulosousas  
          ckoulosousas@gmail.com 
 
Over the past few years the medical, 
legal, and ethical considerations in the 
case of marginally viable newborns has 
become a major area of concern.1  The 
number of premature infants has risen in 
recent years, partially due to the increased 
use of assisted reproductive technology,2 
and the chance of survival for these in-
fants has risen due to the improvement of 
medical treatments that allow infants, 
once thought hopeless, to be saved.3  
Decision making for never-legally-
competent periviable infants, who cannot 
make autonomous medical decisions on 
their own, presents a complicated situa-
tion.  Therefore, a constant struggle exists 
between physicians and families in decid-
ing the proper course of treatment and 
who should make these medical decisions. 
Medical Background 
The decision-making process is fur-
ther complicated because severely prema-
ture infants face a wide range of potential 
mental and physical disabilities.  In a long
-term outcome study of infants born in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, 30 to 
50 percent of children born at earlier than 
twenty-five weeks gestation with a birth 
weight of less than 750 grams (1.65 
pounds) had moderate to severe disabili-
ties, including blindness, deafness, mental 
retardation, and cerebral palsy.4  Studies 
have also shown that many of these in-
fants have more than one disability and 
face an increased incidence of learning 
disabilities as school-aged children.5  
Parents and physicians of these mar-
ginally viable newborns frequently make 
instantaneous treatment decisions upon 
their infant‟s birth.  In most cases, parents 
in high-risk pregnancies will have pre-
pared for these decisions during prenatal 
care.6  Because of the generally unpredict-
able state of these infants prior to physi-
cal examination, however, these decisions 
have to be adjusted time and time again.7  
Physicians are often hesitant to provide 
individualized medical judgments or rec-
ommendations and instead turn to statis-
tics to offer the parents guidance.  Conse-
quently, similarly situated newborns are 
frequently treated differently because 
(„Neonatal End-of-Life Decisions,‟ Continued on page 16) 
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FDA Warnings on the Rise, Not the Usual Suspect  
End-of-Life Decisions in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 
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“[b]road exemptions to mandatory vacci-
nation weaken the entire compliance and 
enforcement structure,” and it contends 
that “the highest number of children pos-
sible must receive vaccines to protect 
them and others.”17  Twenty states cur-
rently offer “philosophical exemptions,” 
similar to the “conscientious exemption,” 
which permit parents to opt out of immu-
nization programs.18  In most of those 
states, overall exemption rates are 
higher,19 and studies have shown that 
more exemptions increase the risk of 
outbreaks.20  Nevertheless, the National 
Vaccine Advisory Committee has stated 
that philosophical exemptions pose no 
significant risk to public health based on 
the small number of people who claim 
them.21  
DHSS‟s statement is nevertheless 
dissatisfying for two reasons.  First, 
DHSS overlooks its duty to balance pub-
lic health with personal autonomy.  When 
state legislatures created modern manda-
tory school vaccination laws in the 1960s 
and 1970s, there were only a few required 
vaccines, and vaccination was uncontro-
versial.22  Those who created the laws 
thought of them as reminders rather than 
tools of coercion.23  With an ever-
increasing number of vaccines, however, 
and popular (though scientifically un-
founded) suspicion that too many vac-
cines cause health problems, notably au-
tism, the New Jersey flu mandate strikes 
many parents as unduly coercive.24  Co-
ercing parents into vaccination might 
reduce the prevalence of the flu, but it 
comes at a high cost to liberty that ad-
versely affects society.25  Heavy-handed 
government mandates can, in the end, 
undermine the public consensus that has 
helped sustain vaccination programs for 
the last fifty years.26   
Second, DHSS‟s statement also fails 
to mention that, in spite of the strict lan-
guage of the New Jersey law, which only 
grants non-medical vaccine exemptions to 
parents with sincere religious beliefs, it 
also informally instructs school adminis-
trators not to question the sincerity of any 
parent who writes a letter claiming to 
hold a religious belief that opposes vacci-
nation.27  Thus, DHSS‟s approach to-
wards increasingly suspicious parents is to 
coerce them into taking the risks of a 
medical procedure with which they are 
uneasy—or to encourage those who 
know about the religious exemption loop-
hole to quietly and permanently opt out 
of all vaccination.  
Proposal  
Rather than oppose the conscien-
tious bill for broadening vaccination ex-
emptions, DHSS should propose that 
New Jersey entirely reform its vaccination 
e x e m p -
tion pol-
i c y .  
Eliminat-
ing the 
vacuous 
religious 
e x e m p -
tion and 
replacing 
it with a conscientious exemption would 
give all parents who oppose any part of 
New Jersey‟s vaccination program, no 
matter what the reason, the chance to 
have their wishes respected, provided that 
they engage in dialogue about the risks 
and benefits of vaccination with a public 
health representative.  Such a policy 
would result in greater respect for paren-
tal autonomy, while maintaining the high 
level of vaccination that is essential to the 
success of a vaccination program. 
An Exemption’s Design Matters More 
Than Its Name 
A 1999 study found that philosophi-
cal exemptions in and of themselves do 
not reduce vaccination levels.28  Rather, 
the ease of obtaining an exemption corre-
lates to the number of children opting out 
of vaccination.29  In many states, claiming 
a philosophical exemption is simply a 
(„New Jersey‟s Vaccination Policy,‟ Continued on page 11) 
medical marijuana may still be quite steep; 
in some states that have passed similar 
acts, an ounce of marijuana costs between 
$100 and $150 at state-regulated dispensa-
ries.25  The Act allows patients to pur-
chase as much as two ounces of mari-
juana per month26—using the numbers 
above, costs could amount to up to $300 
of out-of-pocket costs for qualifying pa-
tients.  The Act additionally prohibits 
home growing marijuana for personal use, 
thus omitting that option as a cheaper 
alternative.27   
Employment Barriers 
Marijuana may still be illegal under 
federal law, but the federal laws prohibit-
ing possession and use of medical mari-
juana are not being enforced in states 
such as New Jersey that have Compas-
sionate Use Acts.  In October 2009, the 
Department of Justice announced that 
while medical marijuana is still rendered 
illegal by the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act,28 the U.S. Department of 
Justice will only sanction marijuana users 
violating federal and state law.29  There-
fore, as long as medical marijuana is used 
in compliance with the Act, users need 
not worry about federal involvement.  In 
effect, New Jersey state law will be con-
trolling on the matter of legal medical 
marijuana. 
(„New Jersey‟s Rigorous Requisites,‟ Continued on page 13) 
‘New Jersey’s Vaccination Policy,’ Continued 
‘New Jersey’s Rigorous Requisites,’ Continued 
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matter of checking off a box on a form, a 
task that is far easier and cheaper than 
bringing a child to a doctor for a series of 
shots.30  The study concluded that states 
that placed “high procedural burdens” 
upon parents, such as requiring the filing 
of paperwork, written letters, parent edu-
cation, and annual renewal had lower non
-medical exemption rates.31 
New Jersey should look to the state 
statutes of Arkansas for guidance in re-
forming its vaccination laws.  In 2002, 
two federal courts in Arkansas ruled that 
the religious exemption in that state was 
unconstitutional.32  Left without any type 
of non-medical exemption, Arkansas re-
formed its laws to provide for philosophi-
cal exemptions with very high procedural 
burdens.33  Specifically, parents must ful-
fill an education requirement and fill out 
paper work on an annual basis in order to 
exempt their children from vaccination.34   
often lack the necessary medical knowl-
edge to make appropriate choices about 
the value of compliance with prescribed 
care.  Faced with limited means to cover 
the higher costs of copayments, patients 
may make decisions that negatively affect 
their health and increase costs.11   
Evidence from multiple clinical stud-
ies indicates that increased cost sharing 
succeeds in reducing consumption of 
pharmaceuticals; however, consumers 
often forego necessary preventive pre-
scription care.  In a retrospective U.S. 
study examining pharmacy claims data 
14 percent in the four classes with statisti-
cally significant effects.16  Evidence that 
the current cost-sharing system inhibits 
important preventive care of patients with 
chronic conditions highlights the need for 
insurance reform. 
Value-Based Insurance Design 
VBID implements cost sharing in a 
way that rewards the consumption of 
appropriate medical care.17  Because pa-
tients lack the information necessary to 
make value-based decisions, reduced co-
payments for targeted interventions re-
duce underuse and increase value.18  
There are two approaches to VBID.  
First, copayment reductions can be tar-
geted to clinically valuable services.19  
Second, certain clinical diagnoses can be 
targeted and copayments reduced for 
corresponding high-value services.20   
(„VBID,‟ Continued on page 12) 
from thirty employers and fifty-two 
health plans, the doubling of copayments 
reduced overall spending by one-third 
and significantly reduced usage across the 
eight most widely prescribed therapeutic 
classes.12  Of particular concern is the fact 
that chronically ill patients receiving rou-
tine care reduced their drug use by 8 to 23 
percent when copayments were dou-
bled.13   A survey of published articles on 
the effects of pharmaceutical cost sharing 
clearly demonstrated that pharmaceutical 
use decreased with increased cost shar-
ing.14  Chronically ill patients with conges-
tive heart failure, lipid disorders, diabetes, 
and schizophrenia used inpatient and 
emergency medical services more with 
higher cost-sharing plans, reflecting de-
creased health.15 Conversely, reduction of 
copayments for five chronic medication 
classes in a disease management program 
reduced medication nonadherence by 7 to 
“VBID IMPLEMENTS COST 
SHARING IN A WAY THAT RE-
WARDS THE CONSUMPTION OF 
APPROPRIATE MEDICAL CARE.” 
sting of coercion becomes greater and 
greater.  The New Jersey conscientious 
exemption could help promote the good 
of parental autonomy and is unlikely to 
seriously undermine public health.  The 
bill could, however, better secure public 
health with an amendment that requires 
annual renewal of exemptions, as the Ar-
kansas law does.  The annual renewal 
requirement would add a significant level 
of inconvenience to the exemption-
seeking process, which would deter per-
manent exemptions based upon both 
convenience and transient parental fears.  
A New Jersey exemption policy that mod-
els itself on Arkansas‟s policy can create a 
better balance between public health and 
parental autonomy. ☼ 
 
The Arkansas policy has many as-
pects that make it far superior to New 
Jersey‟s current exemption policy.  First, 
the policy makes it more difficult for all 
parents to get an exemption than it is to 
simply vaccinate their children.35  Second, 
it forces concerned parents, who may 
have become scared of vaccines due to 
sensationalism or anecdotes that link vac-
cines to autism, to engage in dialogue 
with the public health community.36  The 
recommendation of a trusted doctor 
could convince otherwise skittish parents 
to comply with vaccination requirements, 
if not all at once, then at least eventually.37   
Third, because the exemption is annual, it 
does not allow a parent to permanently 
opt out of vaccination because of a tem-
porary concern.38  
Conclusion 
With the addition of every vaccine to 
New Jersey‟s immunization policy, the 
‘New Jersey’s Vaccination Policy,’ Continued 
‘VBID,’ Continued 
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of exploitation condoned by society, the 
confidence level of women in The Gam-
bia is extremely low.35  He explained that 
because of their lack of self-esteem 
women do not perform to the best of 
their abilities and do not expect much, if 
any, reward for all the work they do per-
form.36 
Another common result of child 
marriage is domestic violence.  Girls often 
have little control over sexual relations.37 
They fear repercussions, such as “physical 
abuse, loss of economic support, or accu-
sations of infidelity.”38  Because they are 
economically dependent, young brides are 
unable to negotiate for condoms and are 
not in a position to resist violence.39  In 
(„Child Marriage,‟ Continued on page 17) 
important adolescent years.31  As a result, 
she is isolated from peers.32  Unfamiliar 
situations, both inside and outside the 
home, create an intensely isolated life.33  
Girls often bear children quickly in an 
effort “to secure their identity, status, and 
respect as an adult.”34  A firsthand ac-
count from a pastor from The Gambia 
reveals the impact of the early marriage 
on girls.  He stated that due to high level 
Because the value of an intervention var-
ies between patients, the second approach 
would result in more efficient resource 
allocation.  However, it would also be 
more costly to implement because eligibil-
ity data is patient specific and must be 
transferred from payers to the point of 
service.21 
Although these programs have re-
ceived attention, many payers have con-
cerns that reduced copayments coupled 
with higher compliance will increase 
costs.22  However, the costs of reduced 
cost sharing and program implementation 
are offset by the savings from health im-
provement.23 “The net financial benefit 
will be greater if the underlying risk of an 
adverse outcome is high, if the cost of 
that adverse outcome is high, if consum-
ers are responsive to lower copayments, 
and if the service is very effective at pre-
venting the adverse outcome.”24  For 
certain chronic illnesses and medical in-
terventions, experimental programs and 
cost analysis have demonstrated that pay-
ers actually save money by reducing co-
payments. 
For example, Pitney Bowes, an em-
ployer of 35,000 people, implemented a 
VBID in which all diabetes drugs and 
devices were shifted to tier 1 copayment 
status, cutting average employee prescrip-
tion costs in half.25  Suboptimal insulin 
adherence decreased by two-thirds and 
use of fixed-combination oral hypoglyce-
mic more than doubled.26  Pharmacy 
costs decreased by 7 percent for those 
with diabetes due to the reduction in 
complications requiring more expensive 
drugs, and total emergency room visits 
decreased by 26 percent.27  Furthermore, 
the average annual increase in Pitney 
Bowes employee health costs grew at two
-thirds the rate of benchmark compa-
nies.28  Overall, Pitney Bowes both in-
creased overall employee health and re-
duced cost. 
Analytical modeling further supports 
these experiential observations.  Modeling 
of health insurance costs for post-
myocardial infarct patients over sixty-five 
years of age indicated that full coverage of 
secondary prevention medications would 
increase compliance from 50 to 76 pe-
cent, reduce deaths by 1.1 percent, nonfa-
tal myocardial infarctions by 13.1 percent, 
nonfatal strokes by 1.2 percent, and re-
duce readmissions for congestive heart 
failure by 6.6 percent.29  Comparing in-
creased pharmaceutical costs and de-
creased event-related costs, insurers 
would save $5974 per patient, saving both 
lives and money.30  Furthermore, this 
analysis indicated that insurers would 
benefit within the first year, eliminating 
the concern over lost investment that 
would result from patient churn.31  
Similarly, the elimination of copay-
ments for angiotensin-converting enzyme 
(ACE) inhibitors for Medicare beneficiar-
ies with diabetes is expected to increase 
utilization by at least 7.2 percent, prevent 
adverse medical events, and save $1606 
per beneficiary.32  Using claims data from 
eighty-eight health plans over five years, it 
was determined that patient compliance 
with cholesterol-lowering therapy fell by 6 
to 10 percent while hospitalizations and 
emergency department visits increased 
when copayments were doubled.33  Fur-
ther analysis showed that elimination of 
copayments for medium to high-risk pa-
tients and increased copayments for low 
risk patients would save $1 billion, not 
including savings from reduced emer-
gency department visits.34 
Conclusion 
The clinical evidence demonstrates 
that differential cost sharing according to 
value will ultimately save money and im-
prove health for specific chronic condi-
tions.  The incidence of adverse events 
and cost to these patients both decreased. 
In comparison to the potential savings, 
the cost to implement specifically targeted 
VBID programs is minimal.  Since it is 
unlikely that far-reaching reforms will 
redesign health care delivery, private and 
public insurers have nothing to lose and 
much to gain by implementing VBID 
programs. ☼ 
‘VBID,’ Continued 
‘Child Marriage,’ Continued 
severity.  Patients with cancer, for exam-
ple, may have surgery related to their ill-
nesses.  If they are intubated (i.e., on a 
ventilator), they will most likely receive a 
sedative for the duration of days, weeks, 
even months.  A common sedative, fen-
tanyl, which is also used for pain after 
surgery, is an opioid in the same category 
as heroin.16  It works by binding to opiate 
receptors in the brain, causing a state of 
euphoria and relaxation.17  It can also lead 
to respiratory depression, confusion, se-
dation, tolerance, addiction, and even 
more serious effects.18  Typically, fentanyl 
may be prescribed in combination with 
other sedatives and painkillers such as 
morphine.19  This is merely one type of 
drug used to treat patients‟ symptoms 
resulting from disease and consequent 
treatment. 
Compare this to marijuana. THC in 
marijuana acts on cannabinoid receptors 
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in the brain, which influence pleasure, 
memory, and perception.20  Marijuana, 
like fentanyl, has addictive potential if 
used for an extended duration, can elevate 
heart rate, and may have adverse effects 
on the lungs, among other possible side 
effects.21  Clearly the drug is not without 
risks, but if used under the prescription 
and supervision of a prescriber, it seems 
that the drug‟s side effects are rather simi-
lar to the side effects of other drugs typi-
cally used in treatment of serious illness. 
When prescribing medication regi-
ments, practitioners must weigh the pos-
sible side effects of a drug against the 
potential benefits a patient will gain from 
it.  Perhaps under controlled circum-
stances and under a doctor‟s supervision, 
a prescription for marijuana may not be 
much different than one for other poten-
tially harmful drugs.  The ultimate deci-
sion about administering any drug should 
be for suffering patients and their physi-
cians to make after weighing the possible 
risks against the benefits.  This balance 
varies with regard to individual patients.  
For example, risks associated with long-
term side effects of smoking marijuana, 
such as lung damage later in life, may not 
matter to a terminal patient with months 
to survive who is seeking immediate re-
lief. 
Regulation Issues 
Marijuana remains an illegal Schedule 
I drug under the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act.22  Despite state laws legaliz-
ing medical use, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has upheld Congress‟s power to prohibit 
marijuana use even where a state has le-
galized it for medical purposes.23 This 
past October, however, Attorney General 
(„So Close Yet So Far,‟ Continued on page 14) 
Consequently, New Jersey must de-
cide the impact of the Act in practice.  
Since the Act is not limited to end-of-life 
treatment, individuals successfully manag-
ing chronic conditions within the guide-
lines of the Act may wish to return to 
work, continue their positions at their 
current places of employment, or enter 
the workforce.  Still, challenges exist for 
such individuals due to the manner in 
which marijuana is commonly taken (i.e., 
by smoking and inhalation) as well as its 
otherwise illegal status.  The Act states 
that “[n]othing in this act shall be con-
strued to require . . . an employer to ac-
commodate the medical use of marijuana 
in any workplace.”30  Workplaces that 
prohibit employees from smoking tradi-
tional tobacco products on the premises 
need not make an exception to accommo-
date marijuana smokers.   
Furthermore, challenges under state 
discrimination law for reasonable accom-
modations are likely to fail if the reason-
ing of a recent California Supreme Court 
case is adopted in New Jersey on the mat-
ter.  In Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunica-
tions, Inc., the court dismissed plaintiff‟s 
argument that not accommodating his 
medical marijuana use at his workplace 
violated California‟s Fair Housing and 
Employment Act.31  The court held that 
there is “no reason to conclude the voters 
intended to speak so broadly, and in a 
context so far removed from the criminal 
law, as to require employers to accommo-
date marijuana use.”32  Since the Act  
expressly states that no accommodation is 
necessary, there is a stronger argument 
that voters did not intend to accommo-
date marijuana use in the workplace. 
But even if individuals who are pre-
scribed legal marijuana leave the work-
place to use marijuana or use it before 
coming to work, their troubles are not 
over.  Employee drug testing is permitted 
in and regulated by the state of New Jer-
sey.  The New Jersey Supreme Court ad-
dressed the bounds of employers regard-
ing employee drug use and employee drug 
testing in Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point 
Oil.33  In Hennessey, the Court proclaimed 
that the New Jersey State Constitution 
represents New Jersey public policy re-
garding drug testing in the workplace.34  
Accordingly, the Hennessey Court followed 
In re Martin, which used a “balancing test” 
for New Jersey constitutional issues: “The 
legitimate public interest [at issue] must 
be considered in balance with the com-
(„New Jersey‟s Rigorous Requisites,‟ Continued on page 14) 
“OVER TIME, NEW JERSEY WILL 
OBSERVE THE BENEFITS AND 
DEAL WITH ANY POTENTIAL COM-
PLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE 
ACT.”  
‘New Jersey’s Rigorous Requisites,’ Continued 
‘So Close Yet So Far,’ Continued 
while also creating buffer zones around 
schools and places of worship.28  The 
effectiveness of such regulatory measures, 
however, remains unclear. 
The potential effect of medical mari-
juana‟s legalization poses additional socie-
tal concerns, as marijuana is the most 
commonly abused illicit drug in the 
United States.29 Where medical use is 
tightly regulated , however, legalization of 
marijuana for medical purposes does not 
mean that illegal abuse for non-medical 
use will necessary expand.  Senator Scu-
tari, the New Jersey statute‟s co-sponsor, 
wanted to avoid laxity pitfalls of other 
states‟ laws, such as California‟s inclusion 
of stress and anxiety as qualifying condi-
tions for prescription, which he feels led 
to abuses.30  Limiting its reach to those 
suffering from cancer, glaucoma, HIV, 
AIDS, and other such physically debilitat-
ing illnesses, in addition to posing numer-
ous other regulations regarding marijuana 
prescribers, insurance coverage of treat-
ment, and accommodations for those 
smoking marijuana for medical purposes, 
New Jersey‟s Compassionate Use Act is 
Eric Holder shifted the focus away from 
prosecuting medical marijuana use in 
states where it was legalized.24  The Attor-
ney General instead directed federal 
prosecutors to concentrate on high-level 
drug traffickers, money launderers, and 
other people who use state law as a cover 
in these fourteen states.25  
As a result of the Attorney General‟s 
shift in focus, the burden of regulation 
and enforcement now falls upon local 
governments, and  many states are now 
struggling to determine the best methods 
of regulation without breaking their budg-
ets.26  In states like New Hampshire, 
which is considering its own compassion-
ate use act, concerns over major budget 
cuts may leave the state unable to admin-
ister another regulatory system.27  Differ-
ent types of enforcement problems may 
also arise for states that have already le-
galized medical marijuana.  In Los Ange-
les, where the number of medical mari-
juana dispensaries rapidly expanded since 
its legalization, Mayor Villaraigosa signed 
an ordinance in February to cap the num-
ber of marijuana dispensaries at seventy, 
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peting right of privacy on the part of the 
affected individuals.”35  The Hennessey 
court concluded that the balancing test 
weighed in favor of employers‟ freedom 
to drug test in “safety-sensitive jobs” due 
to “the urgent need to ensure public 
safety.”36  The court also said that in oc-
cupations where workers “function inde-
pendently” and the “lack of supervision 
renders observation to detect impairment 
impractical” drug tests are permissible.37  
Consequently, the ability to drug test em-
ployees in the state of New Jersey is fairly 
broad. 
The real issue is what employers will 
now do with a positive drug test result in 
light of the Act‟s implementation.  Ac-
cording to the Employers Association of 
New Jersey (EANJ) the legalization of 
marijuana has “caused employers to reex-
amine their „zero tolerance‟ policies with 
regard to drug use by employees.”38  The 
EANJ also recognized, however, that 
“under most state laws, employers are 
free to discipline or terminate employees 
for positive drug test results, regardless of 
whether they are medical users of mari-
juana.”39  In Ross, the California Supreme 
Court further stated that “an employer 
may require pre-employment drug tests 
and take illegal drug use into considera-
tion in making employment decisions.”40  
Ross may be persuasive authority on this 
question in New Jersey as well.  While 
employers may be less likely to take ad-
verse employment actions under the Act, 
there is nothing that can legally stop 
them. 
Conclusion 
The Act is a step in the right direc-
tion, giving hope to so many New Jersey 
citizens in pain and discomfort.  While 
the restrictions that the Act imposes on 
access may seem unduly strict, a sub-
stance that is still illegal under federal law 
and abused by many for recreational pur-
poses arguably warrants such treatment.  
Over time, New Jersey will observe the 
benefits and deal with any potential com-
plications arising from the Act.  Only 
then will we truly be able to see if the 
tight qualifications under the Act should 
be loosened. ☼ 
expected to be the nation‟s most restric-
tive.31  
Conclusion  
The debate regarding medical use of 
marijuana continues, and for good reason.  
Concerns over negative health-related 
effects, regulatory problems, possible 
societal implications, and the fact that it 
still remains an illegal drug in the federal 
domain are paramount issues.  These 
issues must be weighed against the possi-
ble medical benefits for patients unable to 
find effective relief elsewhere, as well as 
the belief that marijuana, like other drugs, 
has the potential for serious side effects 
but can be safely administered under a 
physician‟s supervision.  Both sides of the 
balance show a lack of convincing re-
search and the need for more information 
on potential dangers and benefits.  In the 
meantime, do we force suffering patients 
to accept inadequate relief from debilitat-
ing symptoms, or do we turn to illegal 
means of obtaining marijuana in the ma-
jority of states? ☼ 
‘New Jersey’s Rigorous Requisites,’ Continued 
‘So Close Yet So  Far,’ Continued 
PAGE 15 VOLUME III, ISSUE 2 
Although the FDA has been less 
active in past years,10 there seems to be a 
surge in warning letters under the Obama 
administration.11  In 2006, the United 
States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) issued a report criticizing the time 
the FDA takes to issue regulatory let-
ters.12  The length of time to issue a regu-
latory letter between 1997 and 2001 took 
an average of two weeks; however, during 
2002 to 2005, that had risen to an average 
of four months.13  In addition, the num-
ber of regulatory letters also dropped 
from 142 in 1997 to twenty-one in 2006.14  
The GAO reported that the slowdown in 
issuance was largely due to a 2001 deci-
sion by the Department of Health and 
Human Services to have all such letters 
undergo legal review by the FDA‟s Office 
of Chief Counsel.15 
In response to this drastic slowdown 
in the FDA review process, on August 6, 
2009, the FDA released a press statement 
from the new commissioner, Margaret A. 
Hamburg, stating that she would imple-
ment new enforcement measures to expe-
dite the warning letter process.16  Incor-
porating the advice of the GAO, Com-
missioner Hamburg stated that “the FDA 
will streamline the warning letter process 
by limiting review of warning letters by 
the Office of Chief Counsel to those that 
present significant legal issues.”17  In fact, 
in 2009, the FDA issued 112 regulatory 
letters to pharmaceutical companies com-
pared with forty-three letters in 2008.18  It 
appears the streamlining process has al-
lowed the FDA to increase the number of 
warning letters issued.   
Commissioner Hamburg told a 
group of industry representatives, attor-
neys, consumers, and others attending a 
speech sponsored by the Food and Drug 
Law Institute in Washington, D.C. that 
“the FDA must be vigilant, the FDA 
must be strategic, the FDA must be 
quick, and the FDA must be visible,” in 
order “to prevent harm to the American 
people.”19  As discussed previously, the 
FDA has become more visible and vigi-
lant through increasing the amount of 
regulatory letters issued.  Another benefit 
of the new policy initiatives has been im-
provement of the FDA‟s monitoring ca-
pabilities.  The regulatory letter issued to 
Dr. Leslie Baumann is an example of 
increased monitoring that has captured 
violations that may have been overlooked 
in prior years.   
Dr. Leslie Baumann’s Untitled Letter 
On January 11, 2010, the FDA issued 
an unprecedented20 untitled letter to Dr. 
Leslie Baumann alleging promotion of the 
cosmetic drug Dysport21 (an injectable 
neurotoxin which relaxes facial lines to 
help eliminate wrinkles, similar to 
Botox22) prior to its approval on April 30, 
2009.23  Dr. Baumann is a high profile 
physician who works in the cosmetic 
medicine industry.24  The untitled letter 
cited several communications made by 
Dr. Baumann as alleged promotional 
statements.25  The FDA letter alleged that 
Dr. Baumann made the following com-
ments in the April 2007 issue of Allure 
magazine, in the September 2007 issue of 
Elle magazine, and on NBC‟s “Today 
Show” segment on January 8, 2009:  
Reloxin, the new Botox, will likely 
come out later this year. Early 
data shows it may last longer and 
kick in faster than Botox.  It will 
be nice to have competition on 
the market—the Botox people 
(Allergan) raised their price an-
other 8 percent this year!  
—Allure article 
I can‟t wait to use Reloxin, know 
in Europe as Dysport.  The Botox 
alternative will be available in the 
U.S. next year.  Effects last a 
month longer than Botox and, 
hopefully, it will cost less.  
—Elle article 
It‟s time that we have something 
that lasts a little bit longer, and 
I‟m hoping that the minute the 
FDA approves this, I‟ll be able to 
use it in my practice.  
—Today Show26 
In addition, the FDA alleged that 
these statements clearly suggest, prior to 
its approval, that Dysport was safe and 
effective and that it was in fact superior to 
the approved product Botox.27  In issuing 
its untitled letter, the FDA applied regula-
tion 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(a), which states: 
A sponsor or investigator, or any 
person acting on behalf of a sponsor or 
investigator, shall not represent in a pro-
motional context that an investigational 
new drug is safe or effective for the pur-
poses for which it is under investigation 
or otherwise promote the drug.28  
In response to the FDA‟s investiga-
tion, Dr. Baumann attempted to argue 
that her promotional comments were 
based on knowledge regarding Dysport 
derived from information obtained during 
foreign experiences as an academic physi-
(„FDA Warnings on the Rise,‟ Continued on page 19) 
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“THE FDA HAS A TREMENDOUS 
TASK OF SAFEGUARDING THE PUB-
LIC AGAINST MISLEADING INFOR-
MATION REGARDING UNAPPROVED 
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-CONSUMER MARKETING ENVIRON-
MENT.” 
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These decisions are further compli-
cated by the legal requirements placed on 
hospitals and physicians.  In particular, 
the legal, ethical, and moral dilemmas 
involved render the applicable standard of 
care in the case of severely premature 
infants difficult to ascertain.  “Standard of 
care” is defined in medical terms as a 
“diagnostic and treatment process that a 
clinician should follow for a certain type 
of patient, illness or clinical circum-
stance.”12  In legal terms, “standard of 
care” means “the degree of care that a 
reasonable person should exercise,”13 
which applied in a medical context sug-
gests the “treatment that experts agree is 
appropriate, accepted, and widely used 
[or] how similarly qualified practitioners 
would manage a patient‟s care under the 
same or similar circumstances.”14  Gener-
ally, the standard of care requires resusci-
tation for newborns of twenty-five weeks 
and greater, while resuscitation for new-
borns of less than twenty-two weeks ges-
tational age is not considered appropriate 
or ethical because the risk of survival is 
very low.15   
Medical and legal ethics anticipate 
that physicians will make decisions that 
are in the best interests of the infant.16  
Where the best interests of the infant are 
not evident, however, neither the medical 
nor legal positions as to resuscitation and 
life-sustaining treatment are clear.17  In-
fants born between twenty-two and 
twenty-five weeks are considered at the 
limit of viability;18 thus, any course of 
treatment is uncertain and prognosis is 
always speculative.19  Many experts argue 
that providing treatment to these infants 
is not medically or ethically appropriate 
and serves only to prolong the suffering 
of both the patient and the patient‟s fam-
ily.20  With these considerations in mind, 
who makes these important life or death 
decisions and how? 
(‟Neo-natal End-of-Life Decisions,‟ Continued on page 22) 
parents and physicians vary in their as-
sessment of the probabilities involved in 
an individual prognosis.8   
In the face of this uncertainty, par-
ents often confront the grim choice of 
either refusing medical treatment and 
allowing the infant to die or pursuing an 
aggressive course of treatment with the 
likelihood that the child will either not 
survive after significant suffering or will 
survive with severe abnormalities.9  To 
further complicate the situation, although 
parents and physician may agree on one 
course of treatment during antenatal 
counseling,10 the physician may recom-
mend a different course of treatment 
upon the birth and physical examination 
of the infant.11   Thus, making medical 
treatment decisions is extremely difficult 
and uncertain for marginally viable new-
borns whose fragile state make every sec-
ond critical.   
Legal Background 
ban the products, the e-cigarette “looks 
like a real cigarette, feels like a real ciga-
rette and tastes like a real cigarette, yet it 
isn‟t a real cigarette.”8   
E-cigarettes are generally marketed as 
a healthy, cost-effective alternative to 
traditional smoking.9  E-cigarette advo-
cates and smokers claim that e-cigarettes 
are a safer alternative to smoking and that 
a ban would detrimentally impact the 
smoking community, as smokers continue 
to smoke tar-filled, traditional cigarettes.10 
Additional claims in support of e-
cigarettes tend to highlight the ills of to-
bacco and traditional cigarettes, for exam-
ple: 
Cigarette butts make up 38% of 
litter worldwide.  
More than 400,000 people in 
the U.S. die each year from 
tobacco-related disease.   
4,000 chemical compounds are 
found in tobacco smoke, 
whereas only one or two, nico-
tine and propylene glycol, are 
found in e-cigarettes.  
One in four forest fires are 
caused by tobacco cigarettes.11     
 
Public health advocates generally 
acknowledge that e-cigarettes may be 
safer than traditional cigarettes, yet con-
tinue to argue that e-cigarettes also have 
negative effects that call for regulation.  
Some negative effects include:  
The presence of and addiction 
to nicotine and propylene gly-
col.  
Traditional cigarette use when e
-cigarettes are not available.  
Marketing that suggests e-
cigarettes are safe.  
Flavors that attract young 
smokers.12  
Due to little independent research, 
much about the potentially harmful com-
ponents of the e-cigarette and its byprod-
ucts remains unknown.13  However, re-
search consistently demonstrates that 
nicotine is highly addictive, regardless of 
whether it is delivered in vaporized form 
through e-cigarettes or by way of more 
traditional mechanisms.14   
The FDA Seizes E-cigarette Shipments, 
Asserting Authority over Medical De-
vices  
(„Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 19) 
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this environment of servitude, they are 
often forced into “degrading and humili-
ating” activities.40  
Legal Arguments  
Legal customs in West Africa are a 
combination of religion, cultural customs, 
and imported colonial common and civil 
law.41  Women‟s autonomy in West Africa 
is shaped by the common practices of 
legal institutions, derived from “[n]atural 
law principles of male superiority, com-
mon law and Christian religious principles 
of female inferiority, and Islamic tenets of 
female domesticity and incapacity.”42   
International Treaties 
Today, however, every country in 
West Africa has ratified a human rights 
treaty that addresses health.43   Human 
Rights treaties that address health consist 
of both United Nations Conventions and 
regional agreements.  These treaties in-
clude United Nations efforts such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC),44 the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),45 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW).46  These 
UN Conventions have been widely rati-
fied by West African Countries.47   In 
fact, every West African country has rati-
fied both the CRC and the ICESCR with 
virtually no substantive reservations af-
fecting the provisions on health.48  All 
West African countries have also ratified 
CEDAW; however, the reservations made 
by a few states are extensive.49   
Additionally, most West African 
countries have also ratified regional hu-
man rights agreements.50  These regional 
agreements largely reflect the same rights 
as the UN conventions.  Relevant agree-
ments include the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights,51 the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child,52 and the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa.53    
Major UN conventions also have 
corresponding monitoring bodies at the 
UN.  These committees monitor situa-
tions worldwide and also provide specific 
interpretations of convention provi-
sions.54  The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is-
sued General Comment 14 on the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health, 
initially addressed in the ICESCR.  Gen-
eral Comment 14 requires that states both 
protect and fulfill the right to health.55  
According to the Committee, govern-
ments are required to take action “such as 
by providing relevant services, to enable 
individuals and communities to enjoy the 
right to health in practice.”56  This re-
quires that states take positive measures, 
with special consideration for vulnerable 
groups, to “create, maintain, and restore” 
the health of the population.57   
There are many aspects of forced 
child marriage that affect the health status 
of the young girl.  First, girls should have 
the right to access healthcare.58  Article 24 
of CRC establishes the child‟s right to 
health and to access to health services.59  
In child marriages, however, a girl‟s access 
to medical care is often limited to what 
her husband or her in-laws decide is ap-
propriate.60  Therefore, even if the gov-
ernment provides access to health ser-
vices, it simultaneously curtails access by 
allowing the repressive practice of child 
marriage to persist.  
Both ICESCR and the African Char-
ter require state parties to recognize a 
person‟s right “to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health.”61  Article 14 of The 
African Charter on the Rights and Wel-
fare of the Child also establishes that 
“every child shall have the right to enjoy 
the best attainable state of physical, men-
tal and spiritual health.”62  In addition, 
The Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People‟s Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa demands that states 
“ensure that the right to health of 
women, including sexual and reproduc-
tive health[,] is respected and pro-
moted.”63 
These girls are restricted from 
achieving the best attainable state of spiri-
tual, mental, and physical health.  As dis-
cussed above, these issues include in-
creased risk for HIV and other STDs, 
birth complications, domestic violence, 
mental health issues, and depression.  
Under the CESCR‟s General Comment 
14, states have a positive duty to create, 
maintain, and restore the health of the 
population.  Significant health risks ac-
company child marriage; governments 
have a duty to protect this vulnerable 
population. 
Supporting Case Law 
In the following cases, The African 
Commission on Human and People‟s 
Rights (“the Commission”) analyzes Arti-
cle 16 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples‟ Rights.  Article 16 addresses 
“the right to enjoy the best attainable 
state of physical and mental health.64  
Similar wording is also used in Article 12 
of ICESCR.65 
The Commission evaluated this right 
in the case Free Legal Assistance Group and 
Others v. Zaire.  In this case, the Commis-
sion held that the government of Zaire 
violated Article 16 when it failed to pro-
vide detainees with medicines, safe drink-
ing water, and electricity.66  While access 
to care or medicine is a clear violation of 
the right to health under Article 16, the 
court went further: it stated that lack of 
safe drinking water and electricity was 
also part of the violation of the right to 
health in this case.67  These acts are not in 
and of themselves physical or mental 
harms, but they lead to a subsequent 
health violation.   
(„Child Marriage,‟ Continued on page 18) 
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Free Legal Assistance Group demon-
strates that the state is responsible not 
only for direct physical and mental harms 
but also for actions that subsequently 
result in a health violation.  It is possible 
to analyze forced child marriage in a simi-
lar way.  It is not marrying a young girl 
that immediately results in health viola-
tions; rather, it is the widespread and 
harmful physical and mental health out-
comes that may qualify the practice as a 
violation of Article 16.    
The Commission also addressed 
Article 16 in Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center & the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights v. Nigeria.68  In that case, the 
government allowed oil drilling with es-
sentially no regulations.69  Oil spills led to 
the contamination of the environment 
and subsequent health problems of the 
Ogoni people.70  When applying Articles 
16 (right to health) and Articles 24 (right 
to a safe environment) the Commission 
stated that the government of Nigeria 
must desist from “carrying out, sponsor-
ing or tolerating any practice, policy or 
legal measures violating the integrity of 
the individual.”71  It also held that the 
state must order or at least allow for test-
ing before, and monitoring and evaluation 
of communities after, exposure to hazard-
ous materials.72  
The Rights Action Center case estab-
lishes that under international human 
rights conventions, states have a duty to 
protect their citizens from human rights 
violations, which include health viola-
tions.  Regulating and monitoring the oil 
program could have protected the citizens 
of Nigeria.  As applied to child marriage, 
this would require regulation and moni-
toring of the age of marriage to protect 
young girls from forced marriage and the 
resulting health risks. 
In Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, 
the Commission considered a case that 
involved the treatment of mental health 
patients.73  The psychiatric ward at issue 
was overcrowded and lacked the 
standardized commitment proceedings 
provided by domestic legislation.74  
Article 16 was violated when the state 
failed to develop appropriate therapeutic 
objectives and failed to match resources 
with programs of treatment.75  In its 
decision, the Commission noted that   
“[e]njoyment of the human right to 
health . . . is crucial to the realisation of all 
the other fundamental human rights and 
freedoms.”76  It also recognized that 
special treatment that should be afforded 
to mental health patients.77   
Purohit and Moore requires the state to 
provide even greater protection for 
vulnerable populations under the 
provisions protecting health.  In that case 
the court noted that mental health 
patients should receive special treatment.  
This principal is applicable to child 
marriages because, like the mental health 
patients, these children are a category of 
people that do not have the ability to 
protect themselves.   
Application to Child Marriage 
These cases set forth a standard 
under which child marriage may be 
determined to be a violation of the 
provision on the right to health in Article 
16.  States have an affirmative duty to 
take targeted steps toward ensuring the 
right to health within their available 
resources, and this duty extends to those 
acts that will only result in a future health 
violation.  Moreover, states have an even 
greater responsibility when the population 
to be protected is a vulnerable population.   
 The health implications of child 
marriages—both physical and mental—
are striking.  Young girls in child 
marriages are subject to an increased risk 
for sexually transmitted diseases, birth 
complications, depression, domestic 
violence, and even death.  Increasing the 
marriage age reduces these risks 
dramatically.78  When West African states 
permit child marriage, either by neglecting 
to put laws in place prohibiting them or 
by neglecting to monitor the impact of 
laws already in place, they are permitting a 
practice that results in serious health 
issues.  Furthermore, these children do 
not have the resources or knowledge 
required to prevent the harm to their 
health.  These children constitute a 
vulnerable population that requires 
special protection by the state.   
States have an affirmative duty to 
take steps to prevent practices that result 
in health violations.  Economic 
limitations are not a viable excuse for 
failing to protect health.79  In this case, 
positive steps might include increasing 
marriage age in the domestic legal system, 
mandating evaluations of the law in 
practice, and educating the population on 
the risks of the practice.   
Perspectives 
West Africa has some of the highest 
rates of early marriage in the world.  In 
most cases families are simply doing what 
they believe is best for their daughters.  
Unfortunately, child marriages often 
result in reduced access to education and 
skills training, life-threatening health 
complications, and physical and mental 
abuse.  In order to end this practice more 
coordination is needed.  International 
agencies must set a minimum age for 
marriage and enforce the standards put in 
place.  It is also very important for local 
communities to be involved.  Educated 
communities can make well-informed 
decisions about their local practices when 
they have knowledge of both the risks 
and their rights.80  Finally, states that have 
signed and ratified international human 
rights treaties must monitor the situation 
in their countries and take positive steps 
to protect these children. ☼ 
‘Child Marriage,’ Continued 
“restrict the full exchange of scientific 
information concerning the drug, includ-
ing dissemination of scientific findings in 
scientific or lay media.”32  However, an 
inadvertent consequence of the FDA‟s 
regulation of Dr. Baumann is an unin-
tended restriction on the full exchange of 
scientific information.  The conventional 
standard in the field of cosmetic medicine 
has been for a physician to promote up-
coming drugs or endorse the latest unap-
proved cosmetic uses for existing drugs 
and devices.33  In fact, journalists look to 
these physicians who are leaders in their 
area of expertise to keep them abreast of 
current products in the pipeline.34   
Some industry experts believe this 
type of regulatory letter will limit what 
information an investigator will discuss 
regarding an unapproved drug, as well as 
curb journalist interest in reporting infor-
mation from investigators on unapproved 
drugs.35  At least one investigator has 
stated that he will continue to talk to jour-
nalists about products in the pipeline but 
he might limit his future comments to 
scientific facts and published studies.36  In 
fact, Dr. Baumann herself stated: 
This means, of course, that those 
doctors such as myself who have 
the most experience with the 
newest procedures and products 
will be able to say the least in pub-
lic about them until FDA ap-
proval is issued.  To get the edu-
cated viewpoint, you will just have 
to see me as a patient or wait until 
(„FDA Warnings on the Rise,‟ Continued on page 23) 
cian, as well as from anecdotal observa-
tions of colleagues, and not from her role 
as a clinical investigator in the clinical 
trials of Dysport.29  The FDA recognized 
that regardless of Dr. Baumann‟s source 
of knowledge, “representations by an 
investigator in a promotional context that 
an investigational new drug is safe or ef-
fective for the purposes for which it is 
under investigation, or representations 
that otherwise promote the drug, are a 
violation of FDA‟s regulations.”30  Since 
it is rare for a physician to be issued a 
warning letter,31 the FDA may have used 
Dr. Baumann‟s case to show the cosmetic 
drug industry that the FDA is scrutinizing 
all aspects of promotional violations. 
The above regulation also states that 
the intent of the provision is not to 
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In September 2008, the FDA de-
tained multiple e-cigarette shipments at 
the Los Angeles International Airport 
imported by Smoking Everywhere.15  
Citing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA), the FDA then issued 
a letter to Smoking Everywhere which 
stated that the e-cigarettes “appear to be 
intended to affect the structure or func-
tion of the body, and to prevent, mitigate, 
or treat the withdrawal symptoms of 
nicotine addiction.”16  The FDCA defines 
a drug-device combination as an article 
“intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body”17 or “intended for 
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease.”18  
For example, drug-device combinations 
include transdermal patches and similar 
products that supply a drug through the 
skin to treat various medical conditions.19  
According to the FDA, the e-cigarettes 
were an unapproved drug-device combi-
nation and were to be shipped back or 
destroyed within ninety days.20         
After the 2008 incident, Smoking 
Everywhere filed suit against the FDA, 
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, and Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, 
seeking to enjoin the FDA from denying 
the entry of e-cigarettes into the United 
States.21  Sottera, Inc., which does busi-
ness under the name NJOY, is also an e-
cigarette importer and distributor.22  
When the FDA detained an inbound 
shipment of NJOY e-cigarettes in April 
2009, NJOY successfully intervened 
alongside Smoking Everywhere.23  Ac-
cordingly, the FDA‟s decision to seize e-
cigarette imports was not an isolated inci-
dent, but rather a policy that could poten-
tially impact all e-cigarette importers and 
distributors seeking to enter the U.S. mar-
ket.24   
Tobacco Products or Drug-Device 
Combination?  
The District Court analyzed the 
FDA‟s decision to seize e-cigarettes 
within the complex interplay between the 
FDA‟s authority to regulate drugs/
devices and its more limited authority to 
regulate tobacco products.  Interestingly, 
the complexity arises from a closely 
watched Supreme Court decision, FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., and the 
Congressional response, which resulted in 
( „Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 20) 
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the recently enacted Family Smoking Pre-
vention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA).      
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., the Supreme Court held that 
tobacco products, such as traditional ciga-
rettes, are not subject to FDA regulation 
as a drug or device.25  Congress, however, 
subsequently passed the TCA, extending 
the FDA‟s jurisdiction to reach tobacco 
products.26  The TCA defines “tobacco 
product” as “any product made or de-
rived from tobacco that is intended for 
human consumption.”27  The TCA fur-
ther asserts that the FDA cannot regulate 
tobacco products as drugs, devices, or 
drug-device combinations.28    Thus, the 
TCA provides the exclusive basis for 
FDA regulation of tobacco products.  As 
a result, tobacco products, unlike drugs 
and devices, are not subject to the 
FDCA‟s pre-market drug approval proc-
ess and cannot be banned for failing to 
meet these requirements.29  Rather, the 
TCA requires the FDA to regulate to-
bacco products under a different statutory 
framework than the drug and device in-
dustry.30  Pursuant to the TCA, the FDA 
can enact only a narrow range of regula-
tions and penalties regarding certain prac-
tices of the tobacco industry, such as mar-
keting restrictions, nicotine level restric-
tions, manufacturer oversight, and civil 
penalties.31   
After initiating their suit against the 
FDA, Smoking Everywhere and NJOY 
argued that because e-cigarettes are simi-
lar to traditional cigarettes, the FDA can-
not regulate them as a drug or device 
under the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp.32  Further, Smoking Every-
where noted that, because e-cigarettes are 
considered “tobacco products” under the 
TCA, e-cigarettes are exempt from regula-
tion as a drug-device combination and are 
therefore not subject to the drug-device 
approval process.33  While the TCA al-
lows the FDA to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts, it does not allow the FDA to ban 
the products or to limit acceptable nico-
tine levels to zero.34   
In response, the FDA argued that 
under FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., only traditional cigarettes were out-
side the FDA‟s jurisdiction and that be-
cause e-cigarettes are not traditional to-
bacco products, the FDA has the power 
to regulate them as a drug or device.35  
Next, the FDA argued that e-cigarettes 
are drug-device combinations under the 
definitions provided by the FDCA.36  
Under this line of reasoning, e-cigarettes 
would be subject to the rigorous require-
ments of drug-device combination regula-
tion because the TCA excludes drug-
device combinations from the definition 
of tobacco product.37  Therefore, the 
FDA argued, because e-cigarettes are 
marketed in a manner that would affect a 
structure or function of the body and are 
intended to mitigate nicotine use, they fall 
squarely within the definition of a drug or 
device and are not “tobacco products.”38      
Was the FDA’s Interpretation Reason-
able?   
The District Court gave deference to 
the FDA‟s interpretation under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.39  Chevron requires that the 
court first determine “whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue” and then to give effect to 
Congress‟s “unambiguously expressed 
intent.”40  If Congress did not speak un-
ambiguously, however, the court is obli-
gated to defer to the agency‟s interpreta-
tion, but only if the court finds that the 
agency‟s construction was permissible or 
reasonable.41   
Under Chevron, the District Court 
found that it was undoubtedly ambiguous 
as to whether Congress intended to clas-
sify e-cigarettes as a drug-device combina-
tion or tobacco product.42  The court 
then held that the FDA‟s interpretation 
and subsequent classification of e-
cigarettes as drug-device combinations 
rather than tobacco products, however, 
was entirely unreasonable.43    
First, the court rejected the FDA‟s 
contention that e-cigarettes are intended 
to affect a structure or function of the 
body and are therefore drug-device com-
binations.44  The court noted that this 
interpretation was simply “bootstrapping 
run amuck.”45  If e-cigarettes were classi-
fied as drug-device combinations under 
this theory, then traditional cigarettes 
would also be classified as drug-device 
combinations.46  And if traditional ciga-
rettes were classified as drug-device com-
binations, then the FDA would presuma-
bly have a duty to ban them, because ciga-
rettes are infamously dangerous products 
that would not pass clinical testing.47  
Therefore, because the TCA did not ban 
cigarettes, it was unreasonable to classify 
the similarly situated e-cigarettes as a drug
-device combination “merely because they 
deliver nicotine.”48   
The court then rejected the FDA‟s 
attempt to interpret “tobacco product” to 
include only traditional tobacco products.49  
The court noted that Congress specifically 
enumerated certain types of tobacco 
products such as cigarettes and pipe to-
bacco in some portions of the TCA, yet 
then chose the broadly phrased term 
“tobacco product” in the portion at is-
sue.50  This clearly demonstrated congres-
sional intent to confer jurisdiction over 
tobacco products in a broad manner, not 
just over traditional products such as real 
cigarettes as used in other portions of the 
TCA.51   
Finally, the court rejected the FDA‟s 
claim that e-cigarettes are drug-device 
combinations because they are made to 
prevent or alleviate nicotine withdrawal 
symptoms.52  The court rejected this in-
terpretation because the evidence pre-
(„Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 21) 
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sented at trial showed only that the e-
cigarettes were marketed as a healthier 
alternative to smoking and not as a device 
to reduce nicotine use.53  Rather than 
being marketed to prevent or mitigate 
nicotine addiction, the e-cigarettes actu-
ally encouraged its use and could not rea-
sonably be interpreted as alleviating or 
preventing nicotine withdrawal.54 
Unlike other products that seek to 
alleviate nicotine withdrawal, such as 
nicotine lollipops, waters, gums, or lip 
balms that may fall under the drug-device 
combination definition, the e-cigarettes 
did the exact opposite.55  The court ob-
served, “The clear import of Smoking 
Everywhere‟s advertising is that it wants 
consumers to use its electronic cigarettes 
for the same recreational purposes and 
with the same frequency as traditional 
cigarettes.”56 
In summary, the court held that the 
FDA cannot ban the import of e-
cigarettes on the basis that they are unap-
proved drug-device combinations under 
the FDCA.57  The FDA unreasonably and 
impermissibly constructed the terms drug
-device combination and tobacco prod-
uct.58  In its closing remarks, the court 
further chastised the FDA, stating:      
This case appears to be yet an-
other example of FDA‟s aggres-
sive efforts to regulate recrea-
tional tobacco products as drugs 
or devices under the FDCA. 
Ironically, notwithstanding that 
Congress has now taken the 
unprecedented step of granting 
FDA jurisdiction over those 
products, FDA remains unde-
terred.  Unfortunately, its tena-
cious drive to maximize its regu-
latory power has resulted in its 
advocacy of an interpretation of 
the relevant law that I find, at 
first blush, to be unreasonable 
and unacceptable.59 
While the District Court emphatically 
rejected the FDA‟s ability to regulate e-
cigarettes as a drug-device combination, 
the FDA retains its authority to regulate e
-cigarettes under the TCA.  Moreover, 
public health advocates and cigarette 
smokers continue to insist that legisla-
tures take notice of the debate regarding e
-cigarette safety. 
Perspectives 
The FDA currently regulates items 
such as inhalers60 and nicotine gum.61  
Both of these items must receive FDA 
approval before they can be marketed as 
therapeutic devices.62  If they do not re-
ceive approval, the FDA has authority to 
seize or destroy any unapproved devices 
shipped into the United States.63  Because 
e-cigarettes are not drug-device combina-
tions but rather tobacco products accord-
ing to the district court‟s interpretation in 
Smoking Everywhere, they do not need FDA 
approval and cannot be seized or banned 
under the FDCA.  Therefore, the FDA 
must regulate e-cigarettes just as it does 
traditional cigarettes under the TCA.   
While many will agree that e-
cigarettes may provide a safer or less 
harmful alternative to traditional ciga-
rettes, they still present many of the same 
detrimental health effects as their prede-
cessor.64  As the FDA attempts to regu-
late the products, e-cigarette advocates 
will continue to support the e-cigarette‟s 
ability to decrease tobacco use.  Public 
health advocates may agree and oppose 
an outright ban, arguing that the e-
cigarette may actually provide a safer al-
ternative.  However, they may also sup-
port banning the product because e-
cigarettes promote nicotine addiction and 
have not been approved by the FDA.  
Currently, many countries, including 
Australia,65 Canada,66 and Singapore67 
have banned the sale and use of e-
cigarettes.68  Others have restricted adver-
tising in a manner similar to that of tradi-
tional cigarettes  In California, Governor 
Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill in 2009 that 
would have banned the sale of e-
cigarettes, stating that “[i]f adults want to 
purchase and consume these products 
with an understanding of the associated 
health risks, they should be able to do so 
unless and until federal law changes the 
legal status of tobacco products.”69   
Notably, the FDA cannot require 
that importers or distributors seek FDA 
approval before selling e-cigarettes in the 
United States.  Rather, current law states 
that e-cigarette importers and distributors 
are free to sell a wide variety of untested, 
addictive drug-delivery products, simply 
because Congress has specifically ex-
empted “tobacco products” from the 
FDA approval process.  The rise in e-
cigarette sales and the Smoking Everywhere 
decision highlight the somewhat con-
flicted objectives Congress has assigned 
the FDA: to protect consumers in the 
drug and device marketplace while at the 
same time gingerly policing tobacco prod-
ucts. ☼  
“NOTABLY, THE FDA CANNOT RE-
QUIRE THAT IMPORTERS OR DIS-
TRIBUTORS SEEK FDA APPROVAL 
BEFORE SELLING E-CIGARETTES IN 
THE UNITED STATES.” 
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Generally, medical decisions are 
made by the patient or the patient‟s 
guardian after full informed consent.21  
Informed consent represents the principle 
of disclosure by a treating physician 
which allows the patient “faced with a 
choice of undergoing the proposed treat-
ment, or alternative treatment, or none at 
all, to intelligently exercise his judg-
ment.”22 A physician is required to fully 
inform his patients and obtain their in-
formed consent to any service or proce-
dure before it is performed.23   But an 
exception to the informed consent re-
quirement arises in the case of emergency 
situations;24 a physician has no duty and 
avoids legal liability when it is impractica-
ble to obtain consent from the patient or 
the patient‟s surrogate before treating an 
emergency.25   
The emergency exception arises 
when parents attempt to hold physicians 
and hospitals liable through wrongful life 
suits26 for providing life-sustaining meas-
ures upon birth to severely premature 
infants without their explicit consent.27  
In most situations, however, courts have 
refused to apply the doctrine of informed 
consent, holding that the birth of a se-
verely premature infant in distress and in 
need of immediate medical attention is an 
emergency situation specifically exempt 
from the informed consent require-
ments.28  Further, these courts noted that 
a viable alternative to providing life-
sustaining measures did not exist pursu-
ant to the United States Child Abuse Pro-
tection and Treatment Act29 (CAPTA) 
and therefore no parental decision needed 
to be made.30  CAPTA seeks to prevent 
the “withholding of medically indicated 
treatment from a disabled infant with a 
life-threatening condition,” thereby mak-
ing resuscitation the only option for the 
treating physicians.31  Consequently, at the 
time of birth, physicians may treat a new-
born without parental consent, and, at 
least initially, the only choice available to 
the physicians is to resuscitate the infant 
and attempt to save the infant‟s life.32 
Federal Laws and Their Implications  
Congress has enacted a variety of 
laws that could theoretically inform treat-
ment decision making in the case of se-
verely premature infants.  Since the deci-
sion to treat these infants focuses on 
quality of life and potential future disabil-
ity, anti-discrimination laws naturally be-
come a part of the concern where physi-
cian and hospital decisions are involved.  
The Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) prohibits discrimination by 
“public accommodations,”33 including 
hospitals, on the basis of an individual‟s 
handicap or disability.34   This law, along 
with the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),35  is 
triggered when a hospital delivers an in-
fant and withholds medical treatment 
from the infant solely because of its dis-
ability or potential for disability.36  EM-
TALA requires that hospitals screen and 
stabilize each individual who presents 
with an emergency medical condition or 
in active labor.37  While EMTALA does 
not apply to inpatients on the face of the 
statute, interpretive guidelines set forth by 
the Department of Health and Human 
Services note that a labor and delivery 
department could meet the definition of a 
dedicated emergency department, thus 
excluding infants as inpatients.38   
The Federal government has also 
implemented laws for the prevention of 
child abuse.  CAPTA ensures against pa-
rental abuse or neglect,39 providing states 
with legal recourse, like injunctions, when 
parents withhold or withdraw medically 
necessary life-sustaining treatment from 
infants.40  The Born Alive Infants Protec-
tion Act (BAIPA) accords any infant 
“born alive”41 the same rights and protec-
tions accorded to all citizens under the 
Constitution.42  BAIPA had modified the 
application of EMTALA in the case of 
newborn infants.  The Center for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services issued guid-
ance obligating the hospital to admit the 
patient or comply with the stabilization 
and transfer requirement of EMTALA 
where an infant was born alive “anywhere 
on the hospital‟s campus” and was ob-
served by a prudent layperson to be suf-
fering from an emergency medical condi-
tion.43  The regulations imply that a new-
born infant is not already an inpatient for 
purposes of EMTALA and that the inpa-
tient exception would apply only if the 
infant were “born alive and then admitted 
to the hospital.”44  Although not officially 
binding, the Guidance is consistent with 
the language of both statutes.45 
Who Should Decide and How? 
All of these rules necessarily play a 
role in the decisions of treatment or non-
treatment of severely premature infants 
and to some extent affect the decision-
making ability of the parents.  While phy-
sicians and hospitals are obligated to fol-
low the desires and decisions of the par-
ents regarding treatment of infants, they 
are also bound by the legal regulations.  
Further, because hospitals are required to 
comply with EMTALA regardless of the 
acceptable standard of care or the par-
ents‟ wishes, physicians often find them-
selves in situations where they are forced 
to provide infants with treatment that 
(„Neonatal End-of-Life Decisions,‟ Continued on page 23) 
“GIVEN THE INHERENT UNPRE-
DICTABILITY OF A SEVERELY PRE-
MATURE INFANT’S CHANCE OF 
SURVIVAL, THE CONSTANT IN-
VOLVEMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN IN 
INFORMING AND COUNSELING THE 
PARENTS IS ABSOLUTELY NECES-
SARY.”  
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they consider medically inappropriate.46  
Physicians face a unique challenge in pro-
viding care to severely premature infants 
as they must balance the desires of the 
parents against their legal requirements 
and ethical obligations.  Consequently, 
physicians could be faced with a “lose-
lose” situation if the law requires the phy-
sician to always provide medical care but 
permits the parents to bring wrongful life 
cases for failing to follow their desires to 
withhold treatment.   
It follows that constant open com-
munication between the physician and the 
parents is absolutely essential.  It is the 
treating physician‟s obligation to make 
sure that the parents are aware of all the 
possible options, the prognosis, and the 
risks and benefits involved with any par-
ticular course of treatment.  Physicians 
should make sure that  parents under-
stand the inherent uncertainty of the 
situation and should explain that statistics 
are merely numbers and do not mean 
much when it comes down to the individ-
ual care of this particular infant.  The 
physician should also use his medical 
training and experience to offer the par-
ents advice and suggest a particular course 
of treatment.  The advice should be hon-
est and practical in light of the infant‟s 
best interests, the individual families‟ 
needs and desires, and the physician‟s 
ethical and legal obligations. 
Conclusion 
Given the inherent unpredictability 
of a severely premature infant‟s chance of 
survival, the constant involvement of the 
physician in informing and counseling the 
parents is absolutely necessary.  For this 
reason, antenatal counseling, although 
extremely important, should not end all 
discussions.  Such pre-birth decisions 
have the potential to subject the physician 
and hospital to liability from both sides.  
If no resuscitative measures are taken 
pursuant to the parents‟ antenatal deci-
sion, liability may exist under the ADA, 
EMTALA, CAPTA, and BAIPA.  Con-
versely, if the infant is born in a better 
state than previously predicted and if life-
saving medical treatment is given to the 
i n f a n t 
b a s e d 
on the 
p h y s i -
c i a n ‟ s 
profes-
s i o n a l 
evalua-
tion and 
judgment, the hospital and physician may 
face lack of informed consent and wrong-
ful birth lawsuits by the parents. 
Decisions to withhold life-sustaining 
medical treatment should be made by the 
parents after antenatal counseling, clinical 
evaluation, and initial response to treat-
ment upon birth.  This approach will, 
most importantly, ensure that the treat-
ment is in the infant‟s best interests, and 
ensure that the parents‟ ultimate desires 
are not overlooked because of federal 
laws and the emergency exception to in-
formed consent.  Furthermore, it will 
protect hospitals and physicians from 
liability and ethical violations. ☼ 
‘Neonatal End-of-Life Decisions,’ Continued 
the F.D.A.‟s approval allows the 
doctors with first-hand scientific 
experience to address the medical 
advance.37   
As industry experts grapple with the 
impact of this FDA regulatory letter, the 
consensus may be that an individual in-
vestigator will scale back their dissemina-
tion of scientific information regarding 
unapproved drugs.   
The FDA has a tremendous task of 
safeguarding the public against misleading 
information regarding unapproved drugs, 
especially in a direct-to-consumer market-
ing environment.  Through the direction 
of a new commissioner, the FDA has 
chosen to improve enforcement measures 
munity.  The FDA has 
to balance enforcing 
the Act and the FDA 
regulations with not 
impeding on the real 
life day-to-day ex-
change of information 
among practitioners, 
clinicians, and others in 
the general scientific 
community. ☼ 
by issuing more regula-
tory letters and by in-
creasing monitoring of 
promotional materials 
for unapproved drugs 
and off-label uses.  The 
ability of the FDA to 
capture different as-
pects of promotional 
violations will hope-
fully clarify to practitio-
ners and clinicians the 
appropriate approach 
to discussing unap-
proved drugs and does 
not create a chilling 
effect amongst the 
general scientific com-
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Guest Contributor Professor Thomas L. Greaney 
 
 Visiting Professor Thomas L. Greaney is Chester A. Myers Professor 
of Law and Director of the Center for Health Law Studies at Saint Louis 
University School of Law.  He is co-author of the nation‟s leading health law 
casebook, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (6th edition); 
and a treatise and hornbook on health law, all published by Thomson/West.  
  
 Professor Greaney was named as Jay Healy Health Law Professor of 
the Year by the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics in 2007. Before joining the Saint Louis 
University faculty, he served as Assistant Chief of the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, super-
vising health care antitrust litigation. He has consulted on health law issues for the Federal Trade Com-
mission, several State Attorneys General and the Missouri State Insurance Commissioner.  
  
 Professor Greaney has also been a Fulbright Fellow studying European Community competition 
law in  Brussels, Belgium; and has been a visiting scholar at Universite Paris Dauphine, Paris, France, 
Seton Hall University, and the University of Minnesota. He received his B.A magna cum laude from 
Wesleyan University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. 
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Student Contributors 
Katherine Freed graduated from Stevens Institute of Technology and is 
named as principle inventor on a patent application in the field of medical 
imaging. In 2008, she volunteered with the Irish government‟s Health Ser-
vices Executive, Ireland‟s healthcare system. She has served as a research as-
sistant to Professor Jordan Paradise, studying federal oversight of nanotech-
nology. Katherine worked at Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto last summer 
and will join Robinson & Cole this summer.  
Nicole Hamberger graduated from Gettysburg College in 2008 with an 
English major and a Writing minor. In summer 2009, she completed a legal 
externship at St. Michael‟s Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey.  In college, 
she assisted in medical malpractice and personal injury cases as an intern for 
two summers at Gold Albanese & Barletti in Morristown, NJ, and for one 
summer at Wolf Block Brach Eichler in Roseland, New Jersey.  
Rachel Jones is an L.L.M. student in the Law School‟s Health Law program.  
She graduated from Northwestern University, School of Law in 2001 and has 
since practiced corporate law in New York City.  As a corporate attorney she 
was engaged in several healthcare transactions, which peaked her interest in 
the field.  Rachel is experienced in representing healthcare providers in their 
corporate transactions, including securities offerings, mergers and acquisitions 
and SEC filings. 
Constantina Koulosousas is a third-year student in the Health Law Concen-
tration at Seton Hall Law School.  She is currently participating in the Civil 
Litigation Clinic and plans to pursue a career in Health Law upon graduation.  
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Student Contributors 
Stephanie Mazzaro graduated in May 2007 with a BSN from the University 
of Pennsylvania. Since then she has practiced as a registered nurse in a major 
New York City hospital where she specialized in the Pediatric and Neonatal 
Intensive Care Units, as well as the general pediatrics unit. This past summer, 
she worked as a nurse at a day camp for children with cancer. Stephanie con-
tinues to work part time as a nurse while attending law school to maintain her 
skills and knowledge, and more importantly because she finds inspiration and 
support from her patients and their families on a regular basis. She plans to 
pursue a concentration in Health Law. 
Matt McKennan is a second-year student at Seton Hall Law School, and 
Vice-President of the Health Law Forum.  He graduated from Texas Tech 
University with a B.S. in Biology and an M.B.A. specializing in health organi-
zation management.  During his time at Seton Hall Law, he has served as a 
graduate assistant for the Pre-Legal Studies Summer Program, an intern for 
the N.J. Superior Court‟s Chancery Division, and is currently a law clerk in 
the health care and hospital law practice group at Sills, Cummis & Gross, P.C. 
Dawn Pepin is currently third-year student at Seton Hall University, School 
of Law.  She is a graduate of George Washington University‟s Bachelor of 
Science in Public Health program.  Before beginning law school, she spent 
eight months living in The Gambia working for Tostan, a West-African non-
profit organization.  Dawn plans to use her background in health and human 
rights law to pursue a legal career in international development.   
Michael Poreda is a third-year student at Seton Hall Law School, where he is 
the Executive Director of the Urban Education Law & Policy Initiative.  He 
holds a BA in history from Rutgers University and an MA in the Teaching of 
Social Studies from Teachers College - Columbia University.  He previously 
taught history at Watchung Hills Regional High School in Warren, New Jer-
sey.  
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New Jersey State Bar Association’s Health and Hospital Section, Business Committee, Meeting 
Students attended a Health and Hospitals Section meeting held at Seton Hall, led by members of the Business Committee.  
Members discussed recently passed legislation in New Jersey and its impacts in the health care industry. Attorneys in attendance 
proposed business strategies to deal with the changes in the health care landscape as a result of the new laws.  
 Committee members then opened the floor to questions by colleagues and students. Members sought advice from one an-
other about the potential effects of the legislation on cases in which they are currently involved.  Students appreciated seeing this 
collaboration among practicing health lawyers. Several Committee members also stayed after to meet with students, providing an 
excellent networking opportunity for those in attendance. 
The Health Law Forum thanks the Health and Hospital Section for the opportunity to attend such an informative meeting 
and looks forward to the law school hosting more of the Section‟s meetings in the future.  
Hospitals in Crisis: Debt Restructuring Options and Issues for Financial Survival 
Samuel Maizel, Esq., a bankruptcy attorney specializing in the health care industry, discussed the options available for finan-
cially distressed hospitals, as well as the roles of attorneys in ensuring their financial viability.  Mr. Maizel offered an insider's per-
spective on the bankruptcy proceedings facing a number of hospitals, and he discussed the impact that the new Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act may have on distressed hospitals.  
Blood Drive 
The Health Law Forum directed its second blood drive of the year, in conjunction with the American Red Cross. The spring 
semester blood drive was a huge success, thanks to volunteers from the Public Interest Network and the Health Law Forum.  The 
drive, organized by HLF Vice-President Matt McKennan, was held in the law school‟s Multipurpose Room. The over fifty dona-
tions made by faculty and students will help save over 150 lives. Please join us when the Red Cross returns again next year for the 
fall semester blood drive.   
“Three Grumpy Guys and a Gal”: Health Reform Roundtable Discussion, Upcoming Event 
On April 9th, Visiting Professor Thomas Greaney, guest speaker Professor Sidney Watson (both from Saint Louis University, 
School of Law) will join Seton Hall‟s Professor Frank Pasquale and Professor John Jacobi for a thorough discussion of the recently
-passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The Health Law Forum looks forward to this exciting event!  ☼ 
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Visit our website for past issues of the Health Law 
Outlook, the latest on Health Law Forum meetings, infor-
mation on school-wide health law events, and everything 
else health law!  www.HealthLawForum.com 
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Sarah Geers (3L), Executive Editor, HLO 
Maansi Raswant (2L), Managing Editor, 
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Timothy Norton (3L), Senior Editor, HLO 
Renee Levine (1L), SBA Rep 
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Attending a Business Committee meeting of the 
New Jersey State Bar Association‟s Health and   
Hospital Section.   
A discussion on physician compensation methods in 
clinical trials and treatment. 
Spring blood drive, co-sponsored by the Public    
Interest Network. 
A meeting discussing about the impact of social net-
working on health care and the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. 
About the Health Law Forum 
The Health Law Forum  is a student organization at 
Seton Hall Law School for those interested in health 
law.   
The Health Law Forum hosts speakers, panel discus-
sions, community service projects, and networking 
events throughout each academic year.  
The Health Law Outlook (HLO), a subsidiary of the 
Health Law Forum for students interested in health pol-
icy, hosts regular round-table discussions about current 
topics in the healthcare field.  Each semester, HLO pre-
sents healthcare issues using debate, brain-storming, 
presentation, and Socratic method formats.  Many of the 
articles included in newsletters are the product of these 
meetings and discussion. 
This semester‟s HLO and HLF meetings and events      
included: 
Contact us at SHU.Outlook@gmail.com 
Visit our website at www.HealthLawForum.com 
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